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 The Unintended Effects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
 by
 VlDHI CHHAOCHHARIA, CLEMENS A. OTTO, AND VlKRANT VlG*
 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) was passed in the wake of several scandals that
 rocked corporate America in 2001 and 2002. The objective behind SOX was to
 improve corporate governance by improving accounting disclosures. Compliance
 with Section 404 is considered by many to be the most costly requirement of SOX
 and has been argued to be a disproportionate burden for small firms. Consequently,
 firms with a public float below $75 million were granted several exemptions from
 compliance. We document an unintended effect of these exemptions: a weakening
 of corporate governance through a weakening of the market for corporate control.
 (JEL: G34, G38)
 I Introduction
 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was introduced after a series of corporate scandals
 including those leading to the bankruptcy of Enron and WorldCom and the collapse
 of Arthur Andersen. It has been commonly considered the single most important
 piece of securities legislation pertaining to corporate governance and financial dis
 closure since the Securities Acts of the 1930s. SOX was intended to restore investor
 confidence by placing new rules and restrictions on several corporate entities in order
 to improve the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures. Broadly speaking,
 SOX was aimed at improving corporate governance for public U.S. companies.
 In this paper, we provide evidence of an unintended effect of the SOX legislation
 on small public U.S. firms (see also Romano [2005, p. 1589]). More precisely, we
 find that exempting nonaccelerated filers - firms with a public float of less than
 $75 million - from compliance with Section 404 has lowered the takeover activity
 involving such firms and led to a reduction in the takeover premiums that were paid
 in the acquisitions. These results suggest that SOX, which was drafted as a reform
 * Chhaochharia is at the Business School of die University of Miami; Otto and
 Vig (corresponding author) are at London Business School. We thank Christoph Engel,
 Julian Franks, Christopher Hennessy, Henri Servaes, Irem Tuna, Stefan Voigt, Paolo
 Volpin, Gregory Werden, seminar participants at London Business School, and partic
 ipants of the JITE conference on Business-to-Consumer Transactions (2010) in Bu
 dapest for helpful comments and suggestions. All remaining errors are our own.
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 to strengthen governance, may in fact have weakened corporate governance for
 nonaccelerated filers (small firms) by adversely affecting the market for corporate
 control.
 Significant changes in governance structure, accounting standards, and reporting
 were introduced on account of the new regulations, which imposed substantial com
 pliance costs, especially on small companies (Engel, Hayes, and Wang [2007];
 Leuz [2007]; Piotroski and Srinivasan [2008]; Iliev [2010]). In addition,
 scholars have suggested that SOX altered the incentives to take risks (RlBSTElN
 [2002]; Romano [2005]; Holmstrom and Kaplan [2003]; Bargeron, Lehn,
 and Ztjtter [2010]), led to delistings and significant exits from the public market
 especially for small firms (Kamar, Karaca-Mandic, and Talley [2007]), and
 increased incentives for small firms to remain small (Gao, Wu, and Zimmerman
 [2008]).
 Among the new rules, Section 404 - introduced by the Securities and Exchange
 Commission (SEC) in May 2003 - is widely regarded as the most onerous and costly
 regulation. The section requires companies to employ procedures to monitor and
 control the financial reporting process and to assess the effectiveness of such internal
 controls and procedures in an annual management report. Furthermore, Section 404
 requires that an outside auditor attest to the assessment of the company's controls
 alongside the company's annual report.
 Section 404 became binding for the majority of U.S. public companies (accel
 erated filers) from 2004 onwards. However, companies with a public float - equity
 that is not held by affiliates of the company - of less than $75 million (nonacceler
 ated filers) were granted several exemptions from compliance. For these companies,
 the management's assessment of the internal control systems was not required be
 fore 2007, and the attestation by an outside auditor was not required before June
 2010.
 The size-dependent cutoff for mandatory compliance with Section 404 decreases
 the net benefits of taking over a nonaccelerated filer for a public U.S. company, if
 after the acquisition the public float of the combined venture exceeds the $75 million
 threshold. In such cases, Section 404 becomes binding for the newly acquired entity,
 and the acquirer is faced with the associated costs.1 Furthermore, uncertainty about
 the financial reporting mechanisms and internal controls of a nonaccelerated filer
 might necessitate a more thorough due diligence process prior to the acquisition and
 increase the effective takeover costs even more. For these reasons, we hypothesize
 that the size-dependent nature of Section 404 has made takeovers that would trigger
 mandatory compliance less attractive.
 Extensive theoretical and empirical work, for example by Manne [1965], Jensen
 [1988], and Scharfstein [1988], supports the view that a well-functioning takeover
 Note that while nonaccelerated filers might have expected that they would even
 tually have to comply with Section 404 in the future, the mere postponement of the
 compliance costs has significant value. Assuming yearly compliance costs of $0.7 mil
 lion and a discount rate of 5%, a five-year postponement reduces the present value of
 all future compliance costs by about $3 million - a substantial amount for small firms.
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 market can address governance problems. If Section 404 has made takeovers that
 would trigger mandatory compliance more costly, and if this effect outweighs the
 incentives to merge in order to benefit from potential economies of scale in the
 compliance costs associated with other provisions of SOX, then we expect the
 market for corporate control to have weakened. Therefore, an unintended effect of
 granting exemptions to small companies might have been a weakening of corporate
 governance.
 Among the empirical literature on the effects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, our art
 icle is most closely related to the work of Engel, Hayes, and Wang [2007], Iliev
 [2010], Gao, Wu, and Zimmerman [2008], and Kamar, Karaca-Mandic,
 and Talley [2007]. Engel, Hayes, and Wang [2007] and Kamar, Karaca
 Mandic, and Talley [2007] examine the effect of SOX on the going-private
 decisions of firms. They find that the propensity of small U.S. companies to exit
 the public market has increased since the passage of SOX, while there seems
 to be little effect on the going-private decisions of large firms. Gao, Wu, and
 Zimmerman [2008] and Iliev [2010] study the effects of SOX in general, and
 specifically on nonaccelerated filers. Iliev [2010] documents that compliance with
 Section 404 imposed significant costs, led to more conservative reporting, and was
 associated with lower buy-and-hold returns of accelerated filers over the three-year
 period starting with the signing of SOX. He interprets his findings as evidence
 that compliance with Section 404 was indeed perceived as imposing net costs.
 Gao, Wu, and Zimmerman [2008] examine the incentives for firms to stay below
 the $75 million threshold and find that firms actively managed their public float
 to do so.
 Our work adds to the existing strand of literature in that it explores the effects
 of postponing mandatory compliance with Section 404 on the takeover market
 for small public U.S. firms. In order to do so, we examine the merger activity
 involving U.S. firms with a public float of less than $75 million (nonaccelerated
 filers: small firms) and U.S. firms with a public float in excess of $75 million
 (accelerated filers: large firms) over the period from 2001 to 2007. We find that
 after the passage of Section 404 there was a decline both in the probability that
 a small public U.S. firm is taken over by a public U.S. acquirer and in the premiums
 paid in such transactions. We find no change in the probability that a small public
 U.S. firm is bought by any other type of acquirer, nor do we find a decrease
 in the premiums that are paid in such takeovers. Furthermore, we explore the
 effect of the decline of takeover activity on firms' leverage and cash holdings and
 find that small public U.S. firms decreased their leverage after the introduction of
 Section 404, whereas large ones increased their leverage and decreased their cash
 holdings.
 The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief overview
 of the SOX legislation, and section 3 introduces a stylized model of the effects
 of compliance costs on corporate takeovers. Section 4 discusses our data, sec
 tion 5 describes our empirical methodology and presents the results, and section 6
 concludes.
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 2 Review of the SOX Legislation
 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was introduced in 2002 after a series of corporate scan
 dals that involved accounting irregularities and share price manipulation. The most
 notorious of these scandals is perhaps the collapse of the energy company Enron.
 On November 8, 2001, Enron filed restated financial results with the Securities and
 Exchange Commission (SEC). The restatement was made after several weeks of
 SEC investigations, which revealed various accounting irregularities and showed
 that the company was more heavily indebted than its earlier statements had indi
 cated. Finally, on December 2, 2001, Enron filed for bankruptcy protection, and
 similar accounting irregularities and cases of corporate misconduct in a number of
 firms, including Tyco and Worldcom, were identified by the SEC several months
 later.
 Between December 2001 and April 2002, the Senate Committee on Banking,
 Housing, and Urban Affairs and the House Committee on Financial Services held
 numerous hearings concerning the collapse of Enron and related accounting and
 investor protection issues. These hearings and the corporate scandals that followed
 led to the passage of SOX. The Senate and the House reached consensus on the act
 on July 24 and voted almost unanimously for the act on July 25, 2002. President
 George W. Bush signed the bill into law on July 30, 2002.
 Section 404 of the act was introduced by the SEC in May 2003, and initially,
 accelerated filers (firms with a public float greater than or equal to $75 million)
 were expected to comply in the fiscal years ending on or after June 15, 2004.
 Nonaccelerated filers (firms with a public float smaller than $75 million) were
 meant to comply in the fiscal years ending on or after April 15, 2005. However,
 public outcry led to the postponement of required compliance with Section 404. In
 February 2004, the compliance date for accelerated filers was extended to fiscal years
 ending on or after November 15, 2004, and the compliance date for nonaccelerated
 filers was pushed back to fiscal years ending on or after July 15, 2005. Further
 extensions of one year each were granted to nonaccelerated filers in March and
 September 2005. In August 2006, the compliance date for nonaccelerated filers
 was once more postponed to December 15, 2007, with the additional relief that an
 auditor's attestation would not be required before December 2008. Again, in June
 2008, an additional extension was granted so that the auditor's attestation was not
 required before December 15, 2009. Later on, this deadline was again postponed to
 June 2010. The SEC release approving the extensions specifically stated that this
 would reduce the "cost of compliance" for small firms.
 3 A Simple Model of the Effects of Compliance Costs on Takeovers
 In this section, we argue that the well-meant extensions of the compliance dates
 described in the previous section might have had an unintended, negative effect on
 the market for corporate control for the exempted firms (small public U.S. firms.) In
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 order to do so we make use of a slightly modified version of the model of corporate
 takeovers introduced by grossman and Hart [1980] to show how both takeover
 probabilities and takeover premiums are affected by the costs of complying with
 a given regulation. First, we derive the probability of a takeover and the premium paid
 conditional on a takeover in a setting without any compliance costs as a benchmark
 case. Thereafter, we examine the effects of compliance costs on acquisitions that
 may trigger or remove the necessity to comply.
 3.1 Benchmark Case: No Compliance Costs
 Consider a firm that is owned by a large number of small shareholders,2 which
 is currently valued at V7 > 0, and that would be valued at V/? > V7 in case of
 a successful takeover.3 That is, assume that the value of the firm is higher in the
 hands of the raider than under the incumbent management, and define the total
 surplus that is created in the takeover as A = VR - Vj. Furthermore, assume that in
 case of a successful takeover, the raider is able to capture an amount 0(A) < A of
 the total surplus created,4 such that the first derivative of 0(A) with respect to A
 satisfies 0 < 0'(A) < 1. That is, the raider can extract at most all of the surplus that
 is created, the amount the raider extracts is weakly increasing in the surplus, and
 for every additional dollar of surplus at most one additional dollar can be extracted.
 Finally, assume that the raider faces private costs c > 0 from organizing the takeover,
 where c is a random variable with cumulative distribution function Fc and density
 function fc.
 It is a well-known result that in this setting, shareholders will tender their shares
 if the price p offered by the raider satisfies
 p> V*-0(A) = V, + A-0(A),
 and a profit-maximizing raider offering the lowest price p* that will lead to a suc
 cessful takeover will make a total profit of
 VR-p*-c = <P(A)-c.
 Clearly, the raider will only bid for the target if 0(A) > c, and it follows immediately
 that the probability that the firm will be taken over is
 a(A)^Pr(c<0(A)) = Fc(0(A)).
 The premium paid by the raider in case of a takeover amounts to
 p* VR - 0(A) A - 0(A) p(A) = ? - \ = ??- - 1 =-. ^ Vj V, Vj
 2 Specifically, assume that each shareholder believes that her decision on whether
 or not to tender her shares in case of a bid by a raider does not change the probabil
 ity that the takeover is successful.
 3 In our setting, a profit-maximizing raider would never bid for a firm if Vr < V/.
 4 0(A) might arise for example from a toehold in the target firm or from a provi
 sion in the target's corporate charters that allows the raider to exclude minority share
 holders from a fraction of the increase in value.
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 Differentiating the probability of a takeover and the premium conditional on
 a takeover with respect to A gives us
 a'(A) = /c(0(A))0'(A) > 0
 and
 ,(4)_!^>,o.
 It can be seen that both the probability of a takeover and the premium conditional
 on a takeover weakly increase in the surplus A created by the raider.
 3.2 The Effect of Costly Compliance
 Let us now examine how the probability that a firm is taken over and the premium
 paid in case of a takeover are affected by the introduction of some regulation
 with compliance costs k > 0. We assume that for i e {I, R] we have Vi(k) < Vi9
 where denotes the value of the firm in the absence of any compliance costs,
 and Vi (k) denotes the value of the firm in case it has to comply with the regulation.
 Furthermore, we assume that VR(k) ? V/(fc) = VR ? V7 = A. That is, we assume that
 compliance is costly, and that the decrease in the firm's value due to the compliance
 costs does not depend on who owns the firm. Finally, let us assume that the need
 to comply may be triggered or removed by an acquisition, so that three cases can
 be distinguished: acquisitions that trigger compliance, acquisitions that remove the
 necessity to comply, and acquisitions that do not affect whether a firm needs to
 comply.
 Clearly, if an acquisition triggers compliance, the surplus that is created by
 the raider is reduced, and vice versa, if an acquisition removes the necessity to
 comply, the surplus is larger than in the benchmark case. Thus, if a takeover triggers
 (removes) the need to comply with the regulation, both the probability of a takeover
 and the premium paid conditional on a takeover are weakly smaller (larger) than
 in the benchmark case. In case a takeover neither triggers nor removes the need
 to comply, the probability of a takeover is exactly as in the benchmark case. The
 takeover premium remains unchanged if the target does not have to comply either
 if owned by the raider or under its current management, and the premium weakly
 increases in case the firm must comply in both cases.5
 Applied to the specific setting of exempting small public U.S. firms from com
 pliance with Section 404, the model delivers four testable implications. First, the
 introduction of Section 404 should lead to a decline in the probability that a small
 public U.S. firm is taken over by a public U.S. acquirer as well as to a decline in
 the premiums paid in such acquisitions. Second, the probability that a large public
 U.S. firm is taken over by a public U.S. acquirer should remain unchanged. Third,
 for small public U.S. firms we expect no increase in the probability of being acquired
 by any other (i.e., not public U.S.) type of acquirer, nor in the takeover premiums
 5 Note that V)(*) < V>, so that (A - 0(A))/ V/ (k) > (A - 0(A))/V>.
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 of such acquisitions. Fourth, we expect to find an increase in the probability that
 a large public U.S. firm is bought by a nonpublic or non-U.S. ("other") acquirer, as
 well as an increase in the premiums that these acquirers pay.
 4 Data
 Our main source for acquisition data is the SDC Platinum database, from which
 we obtain all M&A transactions of public U.S. targets between 2001 and 2007.
 We include only completed acquisitions for which the announcement date, the
 target's share price four weeks and one day prior to the announcement, and the
 price per share paid by the acquirer are known. Furthermore, we consider only
 transactions in which the acquirer has crossed the threshold of 50% ownership
 in the target,6 exclude financial and public sector firms, and require that financial
 information for the target be available in the Compustat database for the fiscal year
 that precedes the announcement of the takeover. Finally, we require that the target
 be listed on one of the following six exchanges: NYSE, NASDAQ, American Stock
 Exchange, Chicago Stock Exchange, Pacific Stock Exchange, or Philadelphia Stock
 Exchange.
 We then create a sample of all public U.S. firms in the Compustat database that
 are listed on one of the six stock exchanges we consider and that have a year-end
 market capitalization of less than $500 million. As before, we exclude public sector
 and financial firms and merge the information on the M&A transactions with this
 sample. That is, if a firm in our sample is acquired in a given year, we match the
 acquisition information with the Compustat observation of the preceding year.7
 Finally, we classify each firm in our sample in each year as either small or large.
 We classify firms as small if the public float of these firms is below $75 million,
 and as large if the public float is above $75 million. Clearly, all firms with a market
 capitalization of less than $75 million are classified as small, since the public
 float cannot exceed the market capitalization. Further, we classify all firms with
 a market capitalization between $300 million and $500 million as large, since these
 firms are likely to have a public float that exceeds $75 million.8 For all firms
 with a market capitalization between $75 million and $300 million, we collect the
 firms' public float from the 10K filings with the help of a web-crawling program
 and manually check the results.9 Furthermore, for all takeover observations, we
 distinguish between acquisitions by public U.S. firms that are listed on one of the
 6 We drop observations if information on the percentage of shares acquired or the
 percentage of shares owned after the acquisition is not available.
 7 We match each target with Compustat information of the fiscal year that precedes
 the announcement of the takeover, because it is not guaranteed that a target files finan
 cial information in the year in which it is acquired.
 8 To ensure comparability between our two groups, we exclude firms that have
 a market capitalization that is greater than $500 million from the sample.
 9 Observations for which public float information is missing are dropped from the
 sample.
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 six exchanges we consider and that are neither public sector nor financial firms
 (public U.S. acquirers) and takeovers by any other firms (other acquirers).
 5.1 Number of Firms and Takeovers
 Table 1 presents the numbers of small and large public U.S. firms in our sample, the
 number of acquisitions, and the percentage of acquired firms. The sample period
 is 2001 to 2007 (based on the year in which the acquisitions were announced). In
 Panel A, only public U.S. acquirers are taken into account. Panel B shows the results
 for all other types of acquirers (non-U.S., nonpublic). On average we observe 777
 large firms and 958 small firms, of which 5.10% and 5.48% are a takeover target in
 a given year, respectively. For large firms, the average probability of being acquired
 by a public U.S. acquirer (by an "other acquirer") is 2.16% (2.94%), and for small
 public U.S. firms it is 2.18% (3.29%).
 5.2 Effect of Section 404 on Takeover Probabilities
 In order to examine whether the passage of Section 404 has had a detrimental effect
 on the takeover activity involving nonaccelerated public U.S. firms, we estimate
 5 Results
 Table 1
 Number of Firms and Takeovers
 Year Small firms Targets  % Large firms Targets
 Panel A. Acquisitions of Public U.S. Firms by Public U.S. Acquirers
 1,176 35 2.98% 652 14 2.15%
 1,142 20 1.75% 638 14 2.19%
 1,204 34 2.82% 824 16 1.94%
 1,026 25 2.44% 782 15 1.92%
 823 15 1.82% 814 18 2.21%
 699 11 1.57% 877 21 2.39%
















 1,176 53 4.51% 652 18
 1,142 21 1.84% 638 9
 1,204 43 3.57% 824 10
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 823 27 3.28% 814 34
 699 24 3.43% 877 37
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 linear probability models of the form
 Acquired = a + ft 5404 Small + ft 5404 + ft Small + y'X + s.
 The unit of observation for these estimations is a firm-year combination. For a given
 observation, Acquired is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if an acquisition
 of the firm is announced in that year, and 0 otherwise. 5404 is a dummy that takes
 the value 1 for all years after 2003, Small is a dummy that takes the value 1 for
 small firms, and X is a set of firm-level control variables, industry dummies, and
 year dummies.10 The control variables are the natural logarithm of the firm's market
 capitalization, the firm's market-to-book ratio (sum of market capitalization and
 total long-term debt divided by book value of total assets), EBIT divided by total
 assets, CAPEX divided by total assets, and the firm's leverage (total long-term debt
 divided by total assets). Industry fixed effects are formed at the level of the first two
 digits of the firms' SIC codes. To allow for heterogeneity and correlation of the error
 terms across observations within a given industry, we calculate heterogeneity-robust
 standard errors that allow for clustering at the industry level.
 Table 2 presents the results of these estimations. In Panel A, we take only ac
 quisitions by public U.S. acquirers into account, and in Panel B, we only consider
 acquisitions by other acquirers. Furthermore, we run separate regressions for small
 public U.S. firms (column 1) and for large public U.S. firms (column 2) as well as
 pooled regressions for all public U.S. firms (columns 3 and 4). In all regressions, we
 include the full set of firm-level control variables and industry dummies, whereas
 the year fixed effects are only included in the pooled regressions which are reported
 in column 4.
 In the regressions reported in columns 1 and 2, we essentially compare the
 probabilities of being a takeover target, conditional on covariates, before and after
 the introduction of Section 404 for small and for large public U.S. firms, while
 distinguishing between different types of acquirers. Consistent with the predictions
 of the model introduced in section 3, we find that the coefficient estimate for the
 5404 dummy is negative and significant in the regression estimating the effect of
 Section 404 on the probability that a small public U.S. firm is acquired by a public
 U.S. acquirer (Panel A, column 1). In addition, we find that for large public U.S. firms
 the probability of being acquired by a public U.S. firm was unaffected by Section
 404 (Panel A, column 2).
 We next estimate the effect of Section 404 on the probability of being taken
 over by any other type of acquirer (Panel B). This can essentially be interpreted as
 a placebo test, as for small public U.S. firms there should not be any affect of Section
 404 on the probability of these acquisitions. Consistent with this prediction, we find
 that Section 404 has had no effect on the probability that a small firm is bought by
 acquirers other than public U.S. firms. In addition, we find that the estimated effect
 10 In the regressions that include year fixed effects, we drop the 5404 dummy, as it
 is perfectly explained by a linear combination of the year dummies.
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 Table 2
 Effect on Takeover Probabilities



































































 Notes: The sample period is 2001 to 2007. 5404 is a dummy that takes the
 value 1 for all years after 2003. Small is a dummy that takes the value 1 for
 small firms. Controls are \n(mkt.cap.), MtB, EBIT/assets, and CAPEX/assets.
 Industry fixed effects (Industry FE) are formed at the level of the first two dig
 its of the SIC code. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the indus
 try level. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
 of Section 404 on the probability that a large public U.S. firm is acquired by such
 other acquirers is positive and significant.11
 Finally, columns 3 and 4 display the estimation results for the regressions in
 which we include both small and large public U.S. firms. The coefficient of interest
 in these regressions is the coefficient on the interaction term between the 5404
 dummy and the Small dummy (5404 Small), as it estimates the effect of Section
 404 on the probability of being acquired for small firms by comparing the changes
 11 This finding is consistent with existing evidence that some firms chose to go pri
 vate after the passage of SOX in order to avoid the associated compliance costs.
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 in the acquisition probabilities for small and large firms from before the year 2003 to
 after the year 2003.12 As is to be expected, the estimation results of columns 3 and 4
 confirm our previous findings. Relative to the probability for large public U.S. firms,
 the probability of being bought by a public U.S. acquirer has decreased for small
 public U.S. firms after the introduction of Section 404 (Panel A). This is consistent
 with our hypothesis that the costs of compliance that would be triggered in case
 of an acquisition have indeed deterred some potential public acquirers from taking
 over a small public U.S. firm. In a similar fashion, the results presented in Panel B
 reflect the earlier finding that the probability of being acquired by a nonpublic or
 non-U.S. firm has increased for large public U.S. firms but remained unchanged for
 small firms.
 In summary, the estimation results presented in Table 2 provide some evidence
 that the introduction of Section 404 - and more specifically the exemption of small
 firms from compliance - might indeed have had a detrimental effect on the takeover
 market for small public U.S. firms. Consistent with the predictions of our model,
 we find evidence for a decrease in the probability that a small firm is acquired by
 a public U.S. acquirer and for an increase in the probability that a large firm is
 acquired by any other type of acquirer. At the same time, we find no evidence for an
 effect of Section 404 on the probability that a small (large) firm is being acquired
 by "other" (by public U.S.) acquirers.
 While at first glance the magnitude of the estimated effect appears to be small
 - around half a percentage point for the effect of Section 404 on the probability
 that a small firm is acquired by a public U.S. firm - note that the unconditional
 probabilities of being acquired are very small as well. Only about 2.5% of all small
 public firms in our sample were acquired by another public U.S. firm in a given year
 before Section 404 was introduced, and the probability of being taken over by any
 type of acquirer was only 5.8%. Thus, a reduction of half a percentage point, while
 seemingly small in absolute terms, is in fact a significant reduction when seen in
 the light of the unconditional takeover probabilities.
 5.3 Effect of Section 404 on Takeover Premiums
 We continue our analysis by examining the effect of Section 404 on the premiums
 paid in takeovers of public U.S. targets. As before, we consider the effect on takeover
 premiums for small and large public targets, both separately and relative to each
 other, and distinguish between public U.S. acquirers and all other types of acquirers.
 In order to study the impact of Section 404 we estimate models of the form
 Premium = a + ft 5404 Small + ft 5404 + ft Small + y'X + e,
 12 Note that the estimated coefficients on the interaction term in columns 3 and 4
 are almost identical within each of the two panels. In combination with the fact that
 the only difference between the two columns is the inclusion of year dummies, we
 can infer that the results are not driven by any omitted macro variables such as GDP
 growth or other economic indicators that vary from year to year.
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 where Premium is the natural logarithm of the quotient of the price per share
 paid by the acquirer and the target's share price four weeks before the takeover
 announcement.13 5404 and Small are dummy variables for the years after 2003 and
 for small firms, as before, and X is a set of control variables, industry dummies, and
 year dummies.14 The control variables are the percentage of target shares owned by
 the acquirer before the acquisition (toehold), the natural logarithm of the quotient
 of the target's share price one day prior to the announcement and the share price
 four weeks prior to the announcement (runup), a dummy that equals 1 if the target
 and the acquirer share the same primary SIC code, the target's market-to-book ratio
 (sum of market capitalization and total long-term debt divided by the book value of
 total assets), the target's CAPEX divided by the book value of total assets, and the
 target's cash holdings divided by the book value of total assets. Industry fixed effects
 are formed at the level of the first two digits of the firms' SIC codes. Furthermore,
 to allow for heterogeneity and correlation of the error terms across observations
 within a given industry, we calculate heterogeneity-robust standard errors that allow
 for clustering at the industry level in all specifications.
 Table 3 presents the results of these regressions. As for the analyses regarding the
 effect of Section 404 on the probability of being a takeover target, we run separate
 regressions for small and for large public U.S. targets only (columns 1 and 2) as well
 as pooled regressions for all targets (columns 3 and 4), and we distinguish between
 acquisitions by public U.S. acquirers (Panel A) and other acquirers (Panel B). The
 estimation results displayed in columns 1 and 2 are consistent with the predictions of
 the model introduced in section 3. The significant and negative point estimate for the
 coefficient on the 5404 dummy in column 1, Panel A, suggests that for small targets
 there has indeed been a decline in the premiums paid by public U.S. acquirers. In
 contrast, we do not find evidence for a decline in the premiums paid for large targets.
 Shifting focus to the premiums paid in acquisitions by other acquirers (Panel B),
 we cannot reject the hypothesis that Section 404 has had no effect on the premiums
 for both small and large public U.S. targets. Columns 3 and 4, which display the
 results for the regressions that take all targets into account, confirm these findings
 - the estimated coefficient on the interaction term between the 5404 and the Small
 dummy is negative and significant in the regressions for acquisitions by public
 U.S. acquirers (Panel A). The point estimate of -0.060 translates into a reduction
 of about $5 million - from $86 million to $81 million - in the average price paid by
 a public U.S. acquirer for a small public U.S. target with a market capitalization of
 $60 million (the average size of a small target in our sample). Given that the model
 of section 3 suggests that the reduction in value due to the costs of compliance is
 shared by the raider and the target shareholders, these findings imply a lower bound
 for the costs of compliance of about $5 million.15
 13 To remove the effect of outliers, we winsorize all premiums at the 10% level.
 14 In the regressions that include year fixed effects, we drop the 5404 dummy, as it
 is perfectly explained by a linear combination of the year dummies.
 15 One caveat of this analysis is that it abstracts from potential reductions in the
 competition for targets. While such a reduction may be driven by the compliance costs
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 Table 3
 Effect on Takeover Premiums
 Small targets Large targets All targets All targets
 Controls yes yes yes yes
 Industry FE yes yes yes yes
 Year FE no no no yes
 Panel A: Acquisitions of Public U.S. Firms by Public U.S. Acquirers
 5404 Small - - -0.063* -0.060*
 (0.036) (0.035)
 5404 -0.078** -0.015 -0.001
 (0.032) (0.031) (0.030)
 Small - - 0.070** 0.072**
 (0.028) (0.028)
 /^-squared 0.403 0.425 0.371 0.379
 Observations 148 114 262 262
 Panel B: Acquisitions of Public U.S. Firms by Other Acquirers
 5404 Small - - 0.038 0.037
 (0.044) (0.039)
 5404 -0.008 -0.041 -0.054
 (0.029) (0.048) (0.036)
 Small - - 0.018 0.022
 (0.032) (0.024)
 /^-squared 0.382 0.503 0.393 0.407
 Observations 211 159 370 370
 Notes: The sample period is 2001 to 2007. All premiums have been winsorized
 at the 10% level. 5404 is a dummy that takes the value 1 for all years after
 2003. Small is a dummy that takes the value 1 for small firms. Controls are the
 toehold of the acquirer, the runup in the target's shareprice, a dummy for ac
 quisitions within the same industry, the target's MtB ratio, CAPEX/assets, and
 cash/assets. Industry fixed effects are formed at the level of the first two digits
 of the SIC code. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the industry
 level. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
 5.4 Effects of Section 404 on Leverage and Cash Holdings
 At last, we set out to investigate whether the passage of Section 404 has had an effect
 on the leverage and cash holdings of small public U.S. firms. We hypothesize that
 and entail a decline in premiums, the total reduction in premiums would reflect both
 the direct effect of the compliance costs and the indirect effect through a reduction of
 competition.
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 Table 4
 Effect on Leverage and Cash Holdings



































































 Notes: The sample period is 2001 to 2007. 5404 is a dummy that takes the
 value 1 for all years after 2003. Small is a dummy that takes the value 1 for
 small firms. Leverage is a firm's total long-term debt divided by its total assets.
 Cash Holdings is the firm's cash holdings divided by its total assets. Standard
 errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * denote sig
 nificance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
 as the threat of a takeover goes down, firms might choose lower levels of leverage
 and hold more cash. In order to further investigate these hypotheses, we estimate
 regressions of the form
 Y = a + ft 5404 Small + ft Small + Firm FE + Year FE + e.
 As before, we estimate separate regressions for small and for large firms (columns 1
 and 2, respectively) as well as regressions for both types of firms (columns 3 and 4),
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 and we calculate heterogeneity-robust standard errors that allow for clustering at
 the firm level in all specifications.16
 Table 4 presents the results for the effect on leverage (long-term debt divided by
 total assets) in Panel A, and the effect on cash holdings (cash divided by total assets)
 in Panel B. The estimates for the coefficient on the 5404 dummy in columns 1 and 2 as
 well as on the interaction term between the 5404 and the Small dummy in columns 3
 and 4 suggest that small public firms have indeed reduced their leverage after the
 introduction of Section 404, whereas large firms have increased their leverage. This
 finding is consistent with the hypothesis that a reduction in the takeover threat might
 allow managers to choose lower levels of leverage (Zwiebel [19%], Garvey and
 Hank a [1999]). With respect to the effect on cash holdings, the estimation results
 suggest that large firms hold less cash (relative to their assets) after the introduction
 of Section 404, whereas the hypothesis that Section 404 has had no effect on the
 cash holdings of small firms cannot be rejected.
 6 Conclusion
 In this paper, we have documented an unintended effect of Section 404 of the
 Sarbanes-Oxley Act: a weakening of the market for corporate control for small
 public U.S. firms. Exempting nonaccelerated filers from compliance with Section
 404 has made takeovers of such firms relatively more expensive for public U.S. firms,
 as the acquirer inherits the responsibility for costly compliance if the public float
 of the merged companies exceeds the threshold of $75 million. This in turn has
 led to a decrease in the takeover threat stemming from public U.S. acquirers faced
 by small companies after the legislation was passed and has become manifested
 in a decline of the takeover activity involving small public U.S. companies. To
 the extent that a well-functioning takeover market helps to alleviate governance
 problems by imposing a removal threat on managers, this reduction in takeover
 activity implies that exempting small firms from compliance has had an unintended,
 negative effect on the corporate governance of these firms.
 Furthermore, we have provided evidence that the passage of Section 404 has not
 only reduced the takeover threat faced by small public U.S. firms, but has also had
 a negative effect on the premiums paid in the acquisitions of such firms. Finally, our
 results suggest that the reduced takeover threat might have allowed the managers of
 small firms to choose lower levels of leverage.
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